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Abstract
Organizational theory suggests that authority should lie in the hands of
those with information, yet the power to transfer authority is rarely absolute in
practice. We investigate the validity and application of this advice in a model
of optimal contracting between an uninformed principal and informed agent
where the principal￿ s commitment power is imperfect. We show that while
full alignment of interests combined with delegation of authority is feasible,
it is never optimal. The optimal contract is ￿bang-bang￿ ￿ in one region of
the state space, full alignment takes place, in the other, no alignment takes
place. We then compare these contracts to those in which the principal has full
commitment power as well as to several ￿informal￿institutional arrangements.
JEL Classi￿cation D23, D82.
1 Introduction
A key tenet of organizational theory is the ￿delegation principle￿which says that the
power to make decisions should reside in the hands of those with the relevant infor-
mation (see, for instance, Milgrom and Roberts, 1992 or Saloner et al. 2001). Since
information is likely to be dispersed within a ￿rm, this principle implicitly advocates a
largely horizontal structure, with decision making authority also dispersed through-
out the ￿rm. In practice, some corporations, such as Johnson & Johnson, have a
generally decentralized structure, while others, such as General Electric, appear to
be rather centralized.
The delegation principle implicitly assumes that the objectives of the person given
authority do not di⁄er from those of the ￿rm. When such di⁄erences occur, it may be
￿This research was supported by the National Science Foundation (SES-0095639). We thank
Ernesto Dal B￿ as well as seminar participants at UC Berkeley and the Hoover Institution for
helpful comments.
1necessary to provide the right incentives to properly align the agent￿ s objectives prior
to delegation. Indeed, a second principle of organizational theory is the ￿alignment
principle￿which says that the alignment of incentives and the delegation of authority
are complementary tools (see, for instance, Milgrom and Roberts, 1992, p. 17).
A second complication is that in practice, the authority given to subunits is rarely
absolute. That is, senior management may and, on occasion, does ￿nd it bene￿cial
to intervene on a case-by-case basis. The possibility of ex post intervention will
obviously have an e⁄ect on the behavior of the subunits. In other words, there may
be a commitment problem associated with the delegation of authority.
In view of these issues, how closely should the distribution of power match the
distribution of information? How does the ability to commit, or the lack thereof,
a⁄ect the delegation principle? With imperfect commitment, can a perfect alignment
of objectives be attained? What is the optimal degree of alignment?
With the goal of shedding some light on these and related issues, we analyze the
interaction between an uninformed principal and an agent who is informed about a
payo⁄ relevant state. Interest in the problem arises because the objectives of the
agent may not coincide with those of the principal￿ a project that is optimal for one
in a given state need not be optimal for the other.
In our model the principal may use (non-negative) monetary transfers as a tool
to align the interests of the agent with her own. At the same time, the principal
is assumed to have only a limited ability to commit. Speci￿cally, the principal may
commit to a compensation scheme but not to the project choice. So for instance, the
compnsation scheme could commit the principal to pay the agent depending on the
actual project chosen but the principal retains the freedom to make whatever choice
is optimal for him. Contracts with imperfect commitment of this form are prevalent
in many settings. Investment banking contracts specify a fee schedule depending on
the ￿project￿undertaken by the CEO but the CEO is free to make whatever choices
he wants in light of the advice o⁄ered by the investment bank. Managers at retail
stores (like Wal-Mart) may o⁄er advice on the optimal square footage for the store at
a particular location to the corportate headquarters and their actual compensation
may be tied to the resulting sales via a compensation contract. In the case of Wal-
Mart, where such decisions are notably centrally controlled, the ultimate decision on
retail square footage at a location is retained by headquarters in Arkansas. Bajari and
Tadelis (2001) note that construction contracts between commercial developers and
general contractors consist of compensation schedules based on the project ultimately
undertaken (with the advice of the cntractor) but with authority ultimately retained
by the developer.
Our goal, therefore, is to characterize optimal contracts when the principal￿ s power
to commit is imperfect. The structure of the optimal contract then sheds light on the
delegation and alignment principles in environments where commitment is imperfect.
Investigating optimal contracts in such environments is complicated by the fact
that the standard ￿revelation principle,￿ which allows one to restrict attention to
2direct contracts with truth-telling, cannot be invoked. Indeed, the standard revelation
principle is known to fail when commitment is imperfect (Bester and Strausz, 2001).
Without the revelation principle, there is no systematic way to determine the optimal
contract￿ the class of contracts one may consider is necessarily ad hoc.
A methodological contribution of this paper is to ￿nd a contract under this form
of imperfect commitment that is optimal in the class of all feasible contracts. We
do this by ￿rst establishing that a limited form of the revelation principle￿ su¢ cient
for our needs￿ continues to hold even though commitment is imperfect.1 This allows
us to restrict attention to direct contracts and to study the structure of the optimal
contracts. In a direct contract, the agent provides (possibly noisy) information about
the true state, the principal makes appropriate inferences and chooses a project.
Our ￿ndings regarding contracts with imperfect commitment are as follows:
1. There exists a contract that fully aligns the agent￿ s interests with her own. As
a result, the principal is able to delegate authority to the agent, con￿dent in
the knowledge that in every state, the project chosen will be the same as if she
herself were in possession of the information. While feasible, a full alignment
contract is never optimal.
2. In a leading case of the model￿ the so-called uniform-quadratic case￿ optimal
contracts can be explicitly characterized and involve no payment for imprecise
information.
3. It is never the case that the interests of the agent are only partly aligned. The
optimal contract is of the bang-bang variety￿ in one region of the state space, a
full alignment contract is implemented, in the other region, the principal makes
no attempt to align the agent￿ s interests with his own. This is consistent with
the conventional wisdom that incentives and delegation are complements.
For purposes of comparison, we also derive the structure of contracts with perfect
commitment￿ that is, situations in which the contract speci￿es both how the agent
will be compensated and how project choices will be made. Here we ￿nd:
1. The ability to perfectly commit does not alter the conclusion that full alignment
contracts are never optimal.
2. The optimal contract again involves no payment for imprecise information.
3. With perfect commitment, it is always the case that the interests of the agent
are only partly aligned. The power of perfect commitment removes the need
for the principal to fully align interests in any state.
1The positive result of Bester and Strausz (2001) cannot be applied to our model.
3Related Literature
Our analysis builds on the classic ￿cheap talk￿model of Crawford and Sobel (1982)
which studies the interaction between an informed agent and an uninformed principal.
In their setup, the principal e⁄ectively has no commitment power whatsoever. In
contrast, we allow the principal to commit to transfer payments and, in the perfect
commitment section, to projects as well.
Much of the related literature focuses on a particular speci￿cation with negative
quadratic preferences and a uniform distribution of states. This so called ￿uniform-
quadratic￿case is notable for its tractability and has been extensively used in sub-
sequent applications. For instance, the political science literature on the e¢ cacy of
legislative rules (see Gilligan and Krehbiel, 1987 & 1989 and Krishna and Morgan,
2001), largely concerns itself with this case.
Baron (2000) studies the e⁄ect that ￿contracting￿arrangements have on the inter-
action between an uninformed legislature and an informed committee for the uniform-
quadratic case. His model di⁄ers from ours in many respects. First, he restricts the
set of contracts to those that either involve full revelation over some interval and
no revelation over another (in that case, the committee is said to be ￿discharged￿ ).
Second, the limited liability constraint is replaced by an endogenous participation
constraint. This means that transfers between the legislature and the committee
could be in either direction. Indeed the contract that is optimal in his class involves
transfers from the agent to the principal. Finally, the principal is assumed to be
able to commit to a transfer only when information is revealed. This is a critical
assumption as it can be shown that the principal can improve his payo⁄by means of
a contract that also involves transfers even when the agent is ￿discharged.￿
Ottaviani (2000) also examines how the use of transfers can enhance the amount
of information that the agent shares with the principal. Again, for the uniform-
quadratic case, he shows the possibility of full alignment contracts (this is a special
case of our Proposition 2) and that this contract is dominated by one that delegates
authority to the agent directly but involves no transfers. He does not study optimal
contracts under either imperfect or perfect commitment.
Dessein (2001) also examines the bene￿ts of delegation in a similar model, again
in the uniform-quadratic case.2 Unlike our setting, Dessein does not allow for the
possibility of transfer payments by the principal; hence the ￿alignment principle￿is
inoperative in his setting. Further, the principal is assumed to be able to commit not
to intervene in the project chosen by the agent; thus, issues associated with imperfect
commitment are also absent. In Section 5, we compare optimal contracts in our
setting with delegation contracts along the lines of Dessein. In a similar model with
transfers, Kr￿hmer (2004) allows the principal to commit whether or not she wants
to delegate authority to the agent depending on the message sent by the agent. He
shows that such ￿message contingent delegation￿may be superior both to ex ante
2Dessein also looks at cases where the preferences are concave functions of the quadratic loss
speci￿cation.
4or ￿unconditional￿delegation as in Dessein (2002) and to unconditional retention of
authority.
A separate strand of the literature is concerned with solving the moral hazard
problem of information gathering on the part of the agent or agents (see, for example
Aghion and Tirole, 1997 and Dewatripont and Tirole, 1999). In contrast, our primary
interest is in the role of contracts to elicit information from already informed agents.
In these papers, incentive alignment for e¢ cient information transmission, once the
agent has gathered information, is a secondary consideration.
Finally, our paper is somewhat related to questions addressed in Bester and
Strausz (2001). That paper seeks to extend the revelation principle to settings where
the principal is unable to commit to one or more dimensions of the contracting space￿
as in the question we consider. They show that when the set of states is ￿nite, any
incentive e¢ cient outcome of that mechanism￿ that is, an equilibrium outcome not
Pareto dominated by another equilibrium outcome￿ can be replicated by an equilib-
rium of a direct mechanism. Their result, however, does not apply to our model since
it has a continuum of states. We derive a revelation principle in Proposition 1 that
in the context of our model, applies to all incentive feasible outcomes, not only those
that are also incentive e¢ cient.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: In Section 2 we sketch the model.
Section 3 presents results on full alignment contracts and shows that these contracts
are never optimal. We then derive various structural properties of optimal contracts
and then uses these to characterize in closed form the optimal contract under im-
perfect commitment. Section 4 does the parallel exercise for perfect commitment.
Section 5 compares the value of contracting with several alternative schemes. Fi-
nally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Preliminaries
In this section we sketch a simple model of decision making between an informed agent
and an uninformed principal. The model is virtually the same as that of Crawford
and Sobel (hereafter ￿ CS￿ ) but is amended to allow for transfers from the principal
to the agent. In addition, we allow the principal to contract on certain aspects of her
choices. Which aspects are contractible and which are not is speci￿ed in more detail
below.
Consider a principal who has authority to choose a project y 2 R; the payo⁄
from which depends on some underlying state of nature ￿ 2 ￿ ￿ [0;1]: The state of
nature ￿ is distributed according to the density function f (￿): The principal has no
information about ￿; but this information is available to an agent who observes ￿:
The payo⁄ functions of the agents, not including any transfers, are of the form
U (y;￿;bi) where bi is a bias parameter which di⁄ers between the two parties. The
bias of the principal, b0, is normalized to be 0: The bias of the agent, b1 = b > 0:
In what follows we write U (y;￿) ￿ U (y;￿;0) as the principal￿ s payo⁄ function. We
5suppose that U is twice continuously di⁄erentiable and satis￿es U11 < 0; U12 > 0;
U13 > 0: Since U13 > 0 the parameter b measures how closely the agent￿ s interests
are aligned with those of the principal and it is useful to think of b as a measure of
how biased the agent is, relative to the principal. We also assume that for each i;
U (y;￿;bi) attains a maximum at some y: Since U11 < 0; the maximizing project is
unique. The biases are commonly known.
These assumptions are satis￿ed by ￿quadratic loss functions.￿In this case, the
principal￿ s payo⁄ function is
U (y;￿) = ￿(y ￿ ￿)
2 (1)
and the agent￿ s payo⁄ function is
U (y;￿;bi) = ￿(y ￿ (￿ + b))
2 (2)
where b > 0:
De￿ne y￿ (￿) = argmaxy U (y;￿) to be the ideal project for the principal when the
state is ￿: Similarly, de￿ne y￿ (￿;b) = argmaxy U (y;￿;b) be the ideal project for the
agent: Since U13 > 0; b > 0 implies that y￿ (￿;b) > y￿ (￿):
Notice that with quadratic loss functions, the ideal project for the principal is to
choose a project that matches the true state exactly: for all ￿; y￿ (￿) = ￿: The ideal
project for an agent with bias b is y￿ (￿;b) = ￿ + b:
In the basic CS model, upon learning the state ￿; the agent is assumed to o⁄er
some ￿advice￿to the decision maker. This advice is in the form of a costless message
m chosen from some ￿xed set M. Upon hearing the advice o⁄ered by the agent, the
principal chooses the project y.
We augment the CS model and allow the principal to contract with the agent and
perhaps make transfer payments. We suppose that preferences of the two parties are
quasi-linear. Thus, if a payment t ￿ 0 is made to the agent, then the payo⁄ of the
principal from project y in state ￿ is
U (y;￿) ￿ t
while the payo⁄ of the agent is
U (y;￿;b) + t
We assume that only nonnegative transfers (t ￿ 0) from the principal to the agent
are feasible. In e⁄ect, the agent is protected by a ￿limited liability￿clause and cannot
be punished too severely.3
Two contracting environments are studied.
3While the precise characterizations of the optimal contract make use of this assumption, many
of the qualitative features of the model are una⁄ected if we replace this with the usual ex ante
participation constraint. For instance, Proposition 3 below continues to hold.
61. Imperfect commitment. In this case, the principal commits to transfer payments
but retains ultimate authority over the choice of the project. That is, the
principal cannot commit not to intervene in the choice of projects.
2. Perfect commitment: In this case, the principal contracts in advance on both
the project choice and the transfer.
While the precise form of these contracts is speci￿ed below, throughout this paper
we suppose that the two parties cannot contract on the state of nature ￿: Contracts
are not allowed to depend directly on the realized state of nature since even after
the fact, it may be di¢ cult to verify for a third party.4 With this one exception we
allow the contract to depend on any other variable that is mutually observable and
can be veri￿ed by a third party. For instance, the contract could specify how the
compensation will depend on the project actually undertaken by the principal. This,
of course, allows an indirect dependence of the contract on the state of nature but is
based on something that is veri￿able.
3 Optimal Contracts with Imperfect Commitment
We ￿rst study a situation in which the ability of the principal to commit is imperfect.
By this we mean that the principal is unable or unwilling to bind herself to choose a
particular project as a result of the advice o⁄ered by the agent￿ that is, she retains
executive authority.
Without loss of generality, any mechanism in this setting can then be represented
as a pair (M;T); where M is an arbitrary set of messages and T (￿) is a transfer
scheme that determines the compensation T (m) ￿ 0 that the agent will receive if he
sends the message m. The idea of imperfect commitment is captured by assuming
that of the two instruments available to the principal, project choices y and transfers
t, he can contract on, and commit to, only one. The purpose of the contract is, of
course, to align the interests of the agent more closely with those of the principal.
While the speci￿cation that compensation is based on the message (￿advice￿ )
alone seems unnatural; so it is useful to examine how, exactly, such contracts are,
indeed, without loss of generality. The key is to notice that more ￿realistic￿con-
tracts, such as those described in the introduction, are all accommodated within this
framework. For instance, the compensation contract for an investment bank may
be of the form T (y): The investment bank￿ s advice, m, ultimately leads the CEO
to undertake a project, y (m), and hence to compensation T (y (m)): Thus we may
suppose that T depends on the message m itself.
When the principal can perfectly commit￿ that is, to both a project Y (m) and
a transfer T (m)￿ then the revelation principle may be invoked. Speci￿cally, for any
4See Prendergast (1993) for a variety of other reasons why contracting on the realized state (or
equivalently on realized payo⁄s) may be problematic.
7(full-commitment) mechanism (M;Y;T) and any equilibrium of this mechanism, (i)
there exists a direct mechanism￿ in which the agent reports his private information,
so that M = ￿￿ such that (ii) truth-telling is an equilibrium that is outcome equiv-
alent to the given equilibrium of the original mechanism. The underlying argument
is very simple. The original mechanism can be composed with the strategies that
constitute an equilibrium of the said mechanism to obtain a direct mechanism. It is
then easily veri￿ed that truth-telling is an equilibrium of the direct mechanism￿ it is
incentive compatible￿ and that the resulting outcomes are the same as in the given
equilibrium of the original mechanism. Put another way, incentive compatible out-
comes of direct mechanisms span the set of equilibrium outcomes resulting from all
mechanisms.
The statement above highlights the fact that the standard revelation principle
has two components. First, it allows one to restrict attention to direct mechanisms.
Second, only truth-telling equilibria of direct mechanisms need be considered. The
revelation principle is a powerful tool because, rather than searching over the space of
all possible indirect mechanisms, an impossible task, it allows the analyst to restrict
attention to direct mechanisms￿ that is, it is the ￿rst component that renders the
task of ￿nding an optimal contract feasible.
When the principal￿ s ability to commit is imperfect, the second component of
the revelation principle clearly fails in general. This is because if the principal is
not committed to act in prespeci￿ed ways, when the agent truthfully reveals, the
principal will use this information to his own advantage. Knowing this, the agent
will, in general, be better o⁄not fully revealing what he knows￿ that is, some loss of
information is likely. To see this in the context of the model of the previous section,
suppose that the principal can commit to neither decisions not transfers. In that
case, the model is identical to CS, who showed that full revelation cannot be an
equilibrium.
It remains to see if the ￿rst component continues to hold. For the reasons de-
scribed above, knowing even this component would be extremely helpful. But, as
we demonstrate below (our example is similar to one by Bester and Strausz, 2001),
with imperfect commitment, even the ￿rst component of the revelation principle may
fail￿ there may be equilibrium outcomes of an indirect mechanism that cannot be
replicated by a direct mechanism.
Suppose that the principal and agent have quadratic loss functions where the
agent￿ s bias is b = 1
6; but, in a departure from our model, the state space is binary, that
is, ￿ 2 ￿ = f￿1;￿2g where ￿1 = 1
4 and ￿2 = 3
4: Each state is equally likely. Consider a
contract in which the set of messages has three elements so that M = fm1;m2;m3g
and the associated transfer scheme:
T (m1) = 1
6, T (m2) = 7
48 and T (m3) = 0
8Suppose the agent follows the reporting strategy:
in state ￿1, send either m1 or m2 with probability 1
2
in state ￿2, send either m2 or m3 with probability 1
2
The message m1 is sent only in state ￿1 and thus reveals to the principal that the
state is ￿1: Similarly, m3 reveals that the state is ￿2: The message m2, however, is
sent in both states and so the principal is still unsure as to which state has occurred.
Thus the posterior beliefs of the principal after hearing message mi are
p(￿1jm1) = 1; p(￿1jm2) = 1
2, and p(￿1jm3) = 0
Given these beliefs, the optimal project choices of the principal following mi are
y (m1) = ￿1, y (m2) = 1
2￿1 + 1
2￿2, and y (m3) = ￿2
It is routine to verify that, given the y (mi) as above, it is a best response for the
agent to behave in the manner speci￿ed. Thus when the set of messages is M =
fm1;m2;m3g, there is a contract T and a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) of the
resulting game, in which the principal chooses three possible project with positive
probability.
In a direct mechanism, that is, if M = ￿; then following any report ￿ 2 ￿; at
most one project would be optimal for the principal. Thus, the principal chooses two
possible projects. This means that a direct mechanism cannot replicate the workings
of the indirect mechanism speci￿ed above; nor can it replicate the resulting payo⁄s.
Without imperfect commitment, both components of the revelation principle may
fail. Thus, it is not clear how one should proceed to ￿nd an optimal contract￿ one
that is best for the principal. The set of outcomes depends on the number of messages
that the agent may use to convey information and that the number required messages
may be more than the number of states. What is the ￿right￿number of messages?
In the example above, there were only two states. In our model, there is a con-
tinuum of states and, as we show below, this restores the ￿rst component of the
revelation principle: even with imperfect commitment, any equilibrium outcome of
an indirect mechanism can be replicated by an equilibrium of a direct mechanism.5
3.1 A ￿Revelation Principle￿with Imperfect Commitment
Consider a contract (M;T) in which the agent sends messages m in some set M:
Given a message m, the principal transfers T (m) to the agent. After that he is free
to choose any project y that he wishes. This de￿nes a game between the principal
and agent.
5Following Bester and Strausz (2001), in what follows we refer to this conclusion￿ the ￿rst
component￿ as a ￿revelation principle without commitment.￿
9A perfect Bayesian equilibrium (￿;Y;G) of this game consists of (i) a strategy for
the agent ￿ : ￿ ! ￿(M) which assigns for every state ￿; a probability distribution
over M; (ii) a strategy for the principal Y : M ! R; and (iii) a belief function
G : M ! ￿(￿) which assigns for every m a probability distribution over the states
￿: It is required that following any message m; the principal maximizes her expected
utility given her beliefs; G is derived from ￿ using Bayes￿rule wherever possible; ￿ is
optimal given Y .6
In what follows, an ￿equilibrium￿is always understood to mean ￿perfect Bayesian
equilibrium.￿
Proposition 1 Consider a contract (M;T) with imperfect commitment and any equi-
librium under this contract. Then there exists an equilibrium under a direct contract
(￿;t) which is outcome equivalent.
Proof. Suppose that (￿;Y;G) is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium under the contract
(M;T). Consider two states ￿1 < ￿2. Let y1 = maxfY (m) : m 2 supp￿(￿ j ￿1)g
and y2 = minfY (m) : m 2 supp￿(￿ j ￿2)g: Then we claim that y2 ￿ y1: Suppose to
the contrary that y1 > y2: If T1 and T2 are the transfers associated with y1 and y2;
respectively, then by revealed preference of y1 in state ￿1 we have that U (y1;￿1;b) ￿
U (y2;￿1;b) ￿ T2￿T1: Since U12 > 0, we have that U (y1;￿2;b)￿U (y2;￿2;b) > T2￿T1
which is a contradiction since this means that it is better to induce action y1 and
transfer T1 in state ￿2. Thus, y1 ￿ y2 and so in equilibrium, any two states have at
most one project in common, and projects are strongly monotonic in the state.
Next, we show that for almost every state, at most one project is induced in
equilibrium. Suppose to the contrary that there is some open interval of states I
such that for all ￿ 2 I; there are two projects Y (￿) < Y (￿) that are induced. If
for all ￿ 2 I;Y (￿) is a constant or Y (￿) is a constant then this would violate the
monotonicity derived above. This means that over every open interval I; Y (￿) and
Y (￿) are not constant. Then for a small enough open subset of I; we have that
both Y (￿) and Y (￿) are strictly increasing. But now again, the strong monotonicity
property derived above is violated. Thus for almost every state ￿ there can be at
most one project y (￿). To summarize, we have so far shown that, in any equilibrium
of any indirect mechanism, the agent induces a unique project y (￿), and hence a
unique transfer t(￿), in (almost) every state.
Suppose that under the contract (M;T); the project y (￿) and transfer t(￿) are
equilibrium outcomes in state ￿. Now consider the direct contract (￿;t) and the
following strategy for the agent: Suppose that in state ￿; the equilibrium calls for
project y (￿) to be induced. De￿ne
Z (￿) = f￿ : y (￿) = y (￿)g
6Because of the assumption that the principal￿ s utility U (￿;￿) is strictly concave, it is unnecessary
to allow for strategies in which the principal randomizes.
10to be the set of states in which the project induced is the same as that induced in
state ￿. By the monotonicity property, Z (￿) is an interval, possibly degenerate.
To complete the proof, let the equilibrium strategy of the agent in the direct con-
tract, ￿￿ (￿ j ￿) be the uniform distribution over the elements of Z (￿): This strategy
leads the principal to hold posterior beliefs G￿ identical to those in the equilibrium
of the indirect contract, and so the project chosen by the principal in state ￿ will be
the same in the two equilibria. Thus, the direct contract (￿;t) is outcome equivalent
to the contract (M;T) and this completes the proof.
Like the standard revelation principle, Proposition 1 allows us to restrict attention
to direct mechanisms￿ bypassing the plethora of possible indirect contracts. It should
be contrasted with a similar result of Bester and Strausz (2001) because (a) it concerns
situations with a continuum of states and, as a result, (b) it applies to all incentive
feasible contracts, not only those that are incentive e¢ cient.
3.2 Full Alignment Contracts
Organization and management texts suggest that the provision of incentives and
delegation of authority are complementary. It is argued that the principal should
delegate decision making authority to the agent only after providing incentives such
that the agent￿ s objectives are aligned with those of the principal. In this subsection,
we examine the extent to which this principle applies in our model. In particular, we
examine two related questions: First, with imperfect commitment, is it even possible
for the principal to design a contract that fully aligns the agent￿ s interests with her
own? Second, and more importantly, if it is possible, under what circumstances is
this the best contract for the principal? Proposition 1 allows us to restrict attention
to direct contracts. A full alignment direct contract will, of course, induce the agent
to reveal perfectly his private information in every state.
In the absence of any contracting ability whatsoever, CS have shown that it is
impossible for the principal to induce the agent to fully reveal his private information.
However, we show below that when the principal can contract, albeit imperfectly, this
is no longer he case￿ full revelation is always implementable. We then show that,
despite the fact that such a contract always leads to the principal obtaining her
most desired project in every state, it is never cost e⁄ective. That is, full alignment
contracts are never optimal.
To see that full alignment contracts are always feasible, ￿rst notice that under such
a contract the agent o⁄ers truthful advice; that is, ￿(￿) = ￿: Further, the principal
anticipates that this will be the case; hence y (￿) = y￿ (￿): For truth-telling to be a
best response requires that in every state ￿
U (y





0 6= ￿: The ￿rst-order condition for the agent￿ s maximization problem results
11in the di⁄erential equation
t
￿0 (￿) = ￿U1 (y
￿ (￿);￿;b)y
￿0 (￿)
Since U1 (y￿ (￿);￿;b) > 0 and y￿0 (￿) > 0; a contract that induces full revelation is
downward sloping. Thus among all contracts that induce full revelation and satisfy








It is routine to verify that the contract in (3) indeed induces full revelation￿ that
is, no nonlocal deviations are pro￿table either. To summarize:
Proposition 2 Under imperfect commitment, full alignment contracts are always
feasible.
Proposition 2 can also be derived as follows. A standard result in contract theory
(see SalaniØ, 1997, p. 31) is that with full commitment every monotonic project choice
can be implemented via a truthful direct mechanism with an appropriate transfer
scheme. This implies that y￿ can be so implemented. But since y￿ is ex post optimal
for the principal under truth-telling, no commitment is needed to ensure that the
principal will in fact, choose y￿ (￿) in state ￿. Thus y￿ can be implemented even
without commitment.
Now we show that a full alignment contract is never cost-e⁄ective. To see this,
consider an alternative contract t(￿) that induces the following: the agent reveals any
state ￿ 2 [0;z] where z < 1 and pools thereafter. No payment is made if the reported
state m > z. At ￿ = z; the agent must be indi⁄erent between reporting that the
state is z and reporting that it is above z. If we denote by tz the payment in state z,
then we must have
U (y
￿ (z);z;b) + tz = U (y ([z;1]);z;b) (4)
where y ([z;1]) = argmaxE [U (y;￿) j ￿ 2 [z;1]] is the optimal project conditional on
knowing that ￿ 2 [z;1]: Since for z close to 1; U (y￿ (z);z;b) < U (y ([z;1]);z;b); it
follows that tz > 0:
It is routine to verify that
dtz
dz













Incentive compatibility over the interval [0;z] requires that






12which is again always greater than zero, so this alternative contract is also feasible.









That is, on the interval [0;z], the new contract t is parallel to the full alignment
contract t￿: Indeed, for all ￿ ￿ z we have,
t(￿) ￿ t
￿ (￿) = tz ￿ t
￿ (z)
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￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
z=1
< 0
where the inequality follows from the fact that U1 (y￿ (1);1;b) > 0 and d
dzy [z;1] > 0:
Thus we have shown that for z close enough to 1, the alternative contract t(￿) yields
a higher expected utility for the principal than the full alignment contract t￿ (￿).
The argument above establishes the main result for this section:
Proposition 3 Under imperfect commitment, full alignment contracts are never op-
timal.
13The economic trade-o⁄ captured in this result is the following: For states near
the highest possible state, the direct contracting costs of inducing truth-telling are
relatively inexpensive (t￿ (￿) is close to zero when ￿ is close to 1); however the indirect
e⁄ect of obtaining this revelation is to increase the information extraction costs for
all of the lower states. The alternative contract shows that the informational bene￿ts
of additional revelation in the high states never justi￿es these increased costs. The
principal can locally give up a small amount of information by inducing pooling for
the highest states, but more than recovers this in the global reduction in the costs of
information extraction for lower states.
Delegation and Incentives Consider a situation in which all decision making
authority is transferred to the subordinate (agent), and an appropriate contract is in
place so that he has the incentive to choose the right decision from the perspective







where ￿(￿) ￿ y￿￿1 (￿) denotes the state in which project ￿ is optimal for the principal.
Indeed, the contract in (5) is obtained from that in (3) merely by a change of variable
from ￿ to ￿:
It is easy to see that such a contract fully aligns the objectives of the agent with
those of the principal. So if the former is given authority to choose the project (even
if the principal might override the agent￿ s decision), the agent can do no better than
to choose y￿ (￿) in state ￿: Since this is the principal￿ s most preferred project, she
will not override the agent. But as we have shown above, such an arrangement is
suboptimal￿ it is too expensive to align the agent￿ s incentives completely and then
to transfer authority. Thus, the optimal contract necessarily entails an incomplete
alignment of interests.
3.3 Optimal Contracts in the Uniform-Quadratic Case
What is the structure of optimal contracts under imperfect commitment? To ob-
tain an exact characterization requires placing more structure on the distribution of
states and the payo⁄ functions of the actors. In this section, we o⁄er an explicit
characterization for the uniform-quadratic case.
We begin by establishing some structural properties of optimal contracts. Notice
that, because equilibrium projects are nondecreasing in the state, the state space may
be delineated into intervals of separation￿ where the agent fully reveals his private
information￿ and intervals of pooling￿ where the agent discloses only that the state
lies in some interval.
14No separation to the right of pooling We ￿rst establish that inducing sepa-
ration by fully aligning the interests of the agent with those of the principal is only
cost-e⁄ective in low states. That is, once a contract calls for a pooling interval over
a set of states, it never pays to induce separation for higher states. Speci￿cally,
Proposition 4 The optimal contract under imperfect commitment involves separa-
tion in low states and pooling in high states.
Proof. Suppose there is pooling in the interval [w;x] and revelation in the interval
[x;z]. In the interval [x;z] the contract must satisfy
t(￿) = 2b(z ￿ ￿) + t(z) (6)





￿ (x + b)
￿2
+ twx = ￿b
2 + t(x) (7)
Notice that twx > 0. Otherwise, at x; both the projects w+x
2 and x are too low for
the agent.
At w; the agent must be indi⁄erent between some equilibrium project y together
with some transfer ty ,and the project w+x
2 together with the transfer twx. Hence, we
have









2 + 2zb + y
2 ￿ 2yw ￿ 2yb + t(z)
using (7) to substitute for twx: It is important to note that the transfer ty does not
depend on x:
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3 + 2bzw ￿ bz
2 ￿ t(z)z
Now consider a small change in x, keeping ￿xed all projects and transfers not in
the interval [w;x]: As noted above, this does not a⁄ect the transfer ty associated with
the project y to the left of w: Moreover, since twx > 0; a small change in x is feasible.
The change in expected utility from an increase in x is:
dEV
dx
= ￿(w ￿ x)
2
15and this is negative provided x > w: This means that no contract in which there
is pooling over some nondegenerate interval [w;x] followed by separation over some
interval [x;z] can be optimal.
The property derived above implies that an optimal contract consists of separation
for some set of low states, say for ￿ below some threshold a, followed by a number of
pooling intervals that subdivide [a;1].
No payment for pooling The next proposition establishes an important property:
it is never optimal for the principal to make positive transfers for partial revelation.
Put di⁄erently, for states where the principal does not obtain her most preferred
project, she should o⁄er no compensation whatsoever. Formally,
Proposition 5 The optimal contract under imperfect commitment involves no pay-
ment in any pooling interval.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Propositions 4 and 5 together imply that, under the optimal contract, the agent
is induced to reveal up to some state a and not compensated thereafter. Further, for
any value of a; it can be shown that the number of pooling intervals, K; is uniquely
determined￿ it is the no contracting outcome that maximizes the principal￿ s expected
payo⁄s. (For a formal statement, see Lemma 1 in Appendix A.)
Thus, the optimal contract can be completely characterized as the solution to the









(y ([xk￿1;xk]) ￿ ￿)
2 d￿
where K is determined as in Lemma 1 in Appendix A.
Finally, we show that the interval over which separation takes place and contrac-
tual payments are made is ￿relatively small.￿ In particular, the optimal contract
never involves paying for information more than one-fourth of the time.
Proposition 6 The optimal contract under imperfect commitment involves: (i) pos-
itive payments and separation over an interval [0;a￿] where a￿ ￿ 1
4; (ii) no payments
and a division of [a￿;1] into a number of pooling intervals.























Figure 1: Optimal a
where K is the unique integer such that
3
8K (K + 1)
￿ b <
3
8K (K ￿ 1)
(9)
It is routine to verify that a￿ ￿ 1
4: How a￿ varies with b is depicted in Figure 1.
First, we show that for all b, the payo⁄ to the principal from choosing a > a￿ is
worse than her payo⁄from choosing a = a￿: At a = 1
4, the most informative partition






8b2K4 ￿ 8b2K2 ￿ 6bK2 + 3(1 ￿ 2a)(1 ￿ a)
K2 < 0
using (8). This shows that all a > a￿ are suboptimal since for any such a the most
informative partition of [a;1] can have at most K elements. In particular, dU
da < 0 at
a = 1
4:
Next, we show that for all b, the payo⁄ to the principal from choosing a < a￿ is





The only thing left to verify is that for a < a￿, the utility is lower than at a￿ even if
the number of elements in the most informative partition of [a;1] is greater than K:
Suppose that when a = 0, the maximal size of the partition of [a;1] is N (as in
CS).
17For L = N ￿ 1;N ￿ 2;:::K + 1;K de￿ne aL to be the smallest a for which it is












The principal￿ s expected payo⁄ function is not di⁄erentiable at the points aL since
there is a ￿regime change￿from L+1 to L element partitions. We can however, ￿nd
the right and left derivatives of EV at aL and aL￿1, respectively.
The right derivative of EV at a = aL = 1 ￿ 2bL(L + 1) is,
@EV
@a













But since for all a 2 [aL;aL￿1), there does not exist a partition of [a;1] with L + 1








and so (10) is positive.
Similarly, the left derivative of U at a = aL￿1 = 1 ￿ 2bL(L ￿ 1)
@EV
@a






















and so we have that (11) is also positive.















Discussion The structure of the optimal contract has the somewhat unusual prop-
erty that the interval in which the principal ￿nds it optimal to compensate the agent
to fully align interests is nonmonotonic in the bias of that agent. (See Figure 1.)
Why is this? The key trade-o⁄ is that, by reducing the size of the separating
interval, the principal can induce more information transmission for higher states.
18Obtaining this information for higher states is cost-e⁄ective for the agent in two re-
spects. First, the more precise the information immediately to the right of a￿; the
less expensive is the compensation contract to induce aligned interests since this cre-
ates a parallel shift downward in the transfer schedule. At the same time, there is
a direct bene￿t of obtaining more information in higher states at no cost whatso-
ever. As this trade-o⁄ becomes more or less favorable with changes in the bias, the
optimal contract adjusts the length of the separating interval. Interestingly, the net
bene￿ts from increased information in higher states always outweigh the upside from
increasing the separating interval for states above ￿ = 1
4: That is, it is never in the
principal￿ s interest to compensate the agent more than one-fourth of the time.
4 Optimal Contracts with Perfect Commitment
In the face of the commitment problems implied by intervention in the choice of
projects by upper management, strategic management guides often counsel that man-
agers invest in a reputation for a consistent style of handling intervention. This in-
vestment can involve setting well-established routines before upper management can
exercise authority in intervening in project choice. Alternatively, the ￿rm can seek
to develop a culture for non-intervention or highlight prescribed circumstances for
intervention in its mission statement. What is the value of this commitment? How
does the ability to commit not to intervene a⁄ect the structure of optimal contracts?
Does it now bene￿t the ￿rm to employ full alignment contracts more extensively?
We study these issues in the context of our model. Adding the power of perfect
commitment means that the principal can now commit to both instruments￿ transfers
t and project choices y. When perfect commitment is possible, the standard revelation
principle applies, and it is su¢ cient to consider direct contracts￿ that is, those in
which M = [0;1]￿ which satisfy incentive compatibility. A direct contract (y;t)
speci￿es for each message ￿ 2 [0;1]; a project y (￿) and a transfer t(￿). A direct
contract (y;t) is incentive compatible if for all ￿, it is best for the agent to report
the state truthfully, that is, if ￿ = ￿ maximizes U (y (￿);￿;b) + t(￿). Standard
arguments show that, under perfect commitment, necessary and su¢ cient conditions
for incentive compatibility requires that: (i) y (￿) is nondecreasing; and (ii) t0 (￿) =
￿U1 (y (￿);￿;b)y0 (￿) at all points ￿ where y (￿) is di⁄erentiable (see, for instance,
SalaniØ, 1997).
One might be tempted to apply standard techniques for analyzing this class of
problems; however, there are several features of the CS model that prevent the ap-
plication of standard techniques. Speci￿cally, a usual assumption about the agent￿ s
utility is that U2 > 0; that is, a given project yields higher utility in higher states
(see, for instance, Sappington, 1983). This guarantees that the agent￿ s payo⁄ in any
incentive compatible contract is non-decreasing in the state the limited liability con-
straint (or a participation constraint) is indeed met for all ￿ if it is met for the lowest
type. In the CS model, however, the agent￿ s payo⁄ is nonmonotonic￿ U (y;￿;b) is
19maximized at y = y￿ (￿;b): Hence, it is not enough to ensure the limited liability
constraint only for extreme types and the analysis becomes non-standard.
Full Alignment Contracts First, we revisit the optimality of full alignment
contracts. When commitment was imperfect, we saw that these contracts were fea-
sible but not optimal (Propositions 2 and 3). Clearly any contract that is feasible
under imperfect commitment is feasible under perfect commitment. And since the
full alignment contract was never optimal in the former circumstances, it is never
optimal under the latter either. Thus it immediately follows that:
Corollary 1 Under perfect commitment, full alignment contracts are always feasible
but never optimal.
Thus, even when the principal can perfectly commit not to intervene, the best
policy is still not to align the incentives of the agent and delegate decision making
responsibility fully to the informed party.
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where y and t are the state variables and u is the control variable. Notice that local
incentive compatibility constraints are captured in the law of motion, which says that
either: (i) y is locally strictly increasing, and in that case y and t are related according
to (12); or (ii) y and t are both locally constant. That local incentive compatibility
implies global incentive compatibility follows from standard arguments.
Necessary conditions that the optimal contract must satisfy can be obtained using
standard methods of control theory and some salient features of the optimal contract
under perfect commitment can be inferred from these. Appendix B contains the
detailed analysis and shows that the optimal contract under perfect commitment
involves:
1. Non-alignment of objectives. The principal (almost) never fully aligns the
agent￿ s objectives with her own. Instead, in states in which the principal com-
pensates the agent, he does so in such a way that the chosen project lies between
her most preferred project and that of the agent. (Lemmas 2 and 4 in Appendix
B.)
202. ￿Caps￿on project choice. The principal places a ￿cap￿on the highest project
that the agent can induce and does not compensate the agent if he does so.
As a consequence, for high states, projects are unresponsive to the state. Put
di⁄erently, the optimal contract always involves pooling in high states. (Lemma
5 in Appendix B.)
3. No strategic ￿overshooting￿ . The principal can set incentives in such a way
that in some states the agent induces a project that is higher than his most
preferred action. While this is clearly undesirable for the principal in a local
sense, such ￿strategic overshooting￿could, in theory, reduce the principal￿ s costs
of obtaining more preferred projects in other states. While this kind of contract
is feasible, it is never optimal.7 (Lemma 2.)
Recall that under imperfect commitment, it was optimal for the principal to set
the compensation scheme such that, in low states, the interests of the agent were
fully aligned with the principal. The key advantage of perfect commitment is that
the principal now ￿nds it in her interest never to align the interests of the agent with
her own in any state. Put di⁄erently, the power of commitment saves the principal
the expense of full alignment.
￿Capped￿Delegation and Optimal Contracts While our characterization
concerns the direct contract, an outcome equivalent indirect contract is as follows:
The principal delegates the decision about project choice to the agent, but restricts
the agent to select from a menu of projects which is ￿capped￿ ￿ the highest project
available to the agent, ￿ y (say) is less than y￿ (1): Further, the principal speci￿es a
compensation schedule as a function of the project chosen by the agent. This schedule
entails higher levels of compensation for low projects and no compensation when ￿ y is
selected. Since the principal is committed not to intervene, the agent simply chooses
her most preferred project (taking into account the compensation scheme and the
cap) for the given state.
Notice that the optimal delegation scheme does not entail a full alignment of
objectives; nor does it entail giving the agent complete freedom in project choice.
Uniform-Quadratic Case We conclude this section with an explicit character-
ization of the optimal contract for the uniform-quadratic case under perfect commit-
ment. The qualitative features of the contract when the bias is low di⁄er somewhat
from those when the bias is high.
When the bias is low, that is, if b ￿ 1
3, the optimal contract has three separate
pieces (see Figure 2). In low states, that is when ￿ ￿ b, the project y (￿) = 3
2￿ + 1
2b
lies between that optimal for the principal (y￿ (￿) = ￿) and that optimal for the agent
(y￿ (￿;b) = ￿ +b). As ￿ increases, the project chosen tilts increasingly in favor of the
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Figure 2: Optimal Contract with Perfect Commitment, b ￿ 1
3
agent, with a commensurate decrease in the transfer payments. For states between b
and 1 ￿ 2b, the project that is best for the agent (y￿ (￿;b) = ￿ + b) is played and no
transfers are made. It is as if the project choice were delegated to the agent. The set
of feasible projects is ￿capped￿at ￿ y = 1 ￿ b: For states above 1 ￿ 2b, the project is
unresponsive to the state￿ that is, the agent always chooses project ￿ y and there is,
e⁄ectively, pooling over this interval.
When the bias is high, that is, 1
3 < b ￿ 1; the optimal contract consists of only
two pieces (see Figure 3). In low states, the project again lies between the project
ideal for the principal and that ideal for the agent. As in the case when the bias is
low, the choice tilts in favor of the agent as the state increases with a corresponding
decrease in the transfer payments. The set of feasible projects is again capped, but
at a lower level. Indeed, as the agent becomes more biased, the cap decreases; that
is, the agent becomes more constrained in her choice of projects. For high states; the
agent always chooses the highest feasible project and there is, e⁄ectively, pooling over
this interval. Unlike the case of low bias, there is no region in which the principal
e⁄ectively delegates authority to the agent.
For very high biases, that is when b > 1; contracting is of no use￿ the optimal
contract is no contract at all.
5 The Value of Contracting
It is argued (e.g., Coase, 1937, Williamson, 1975) that creating formal contracting
arrangements between principals and agents is inherently costly. Further, as contracts

















Figure 3: Optimal Contract with Perfect Commitment, b > 1
3
might increase. In this section, we compare the value of contracting under full and
imperfect commitment with two, arguably less costly regimes: no contracting and
full delegation. When contracting is costly, when is it worthwhile to write contracts?
How does the value of contracting di⁄er depending on the degree of commitment?
When is full delegation worthwhile? In the uniform-quadratic case explicit answers
to these questions may be obtained.
Gains from Contracting Figure 4 depicts the expected payo⁄s from three
alternative arrangements: the optimal contract under imperfect commitment, the
optimal contract under perfect commitment, and ￿nally, no contract at all.8 The
key thing to notice about the ￿gure is that the gains from contracting￿ with or
without perfect commitment￿ are nonmonotonic in the degree of bias. Clearly, when
the preferences of the agent and the principal are closely aligned the latter￿ s payo⁄is
close to her ￿rst-best level. In this case, the potential upside from contracting is quite
limited. As the bias increases, the informational losses to the principal become more
severe and there is more scope for contracting to ￿￿x￿the incentive problem. For cases
of severe bias, b ￿ 1
4; absent contracts, the agent can credibly reveal no information.
Resorting to contracts improves the situation, but the cost of aligning the agent￿ s
preferences increases until, at b ￿ 1
2; it becomes prohibitively costly for the principal.
Thus, when the agent￿ s preferences are extreme, the gains from contracting are also
limited. This suggests that if there were some costs associated with ￿formalizing￿
the exchange of information between principals and agents by writing contracts, one
8To compute the payo⁄s under no contracting, we select the equilibrium maximizing the decision






















Figure 4: Value of Contracting
would expect to see contracts in cases of intermediate bias, but not when incentives
are relatively closely aligned nor when the agent being consulted is an extremist.
Contracting versus Full Delegation Strategic management texts often sug-
gest that, for businesses faced with decentralized information, delegation (or a ￿ at
organizational structure) is the appropriate response. For example, Saloner, Shepard,
and Podolny (2001, pp. 79-80) write: ￿One basic principle of organization design is
to assign authority to those who have information.￿
In the context of our model, the validity of the delegation principle may be ex-
amined by comparing full delegation￿ the unconditional assignment of authority to
the person with information￿ to the optimal contracting arrangement with imper-
fect commitment. By ￿full￿delegation we mean that the principal commits not to
exercise any discretionary authority and so no longer has the freedom to intervene
ex post. Speci￿cally, there are no ￿caps￿on what project the agent may choose. In
that case, the agent will, of course, choose his favorite project y￿ (￿;b) = ￿+b in each
state, and the payo⁄ of the principal is simply ￿b2.
Figure 5 compares the principal￿ s expected payo⁄s from the optimal contract un-
der imperfect commitment with those from full delegation.9 As the ￿gure shows,
contracting under imperfect commitment is superior to full delegation only when the
bias of the agent is high, b > 0:244: Recall that the optimal contract lies between the
principal￿ s favorite project and that of the agent. This arises because it is more cost-
e⁄ective for the principal to economize on transfers by compromising on projects.
9In an important paper, Dessein (2002) has shown, again for the uniform-quadratic case, that


















Figure 5: Contracts vs. Delegation
Full delegation is an extreme version of this idea￿ the principal pays no transfers
but instead of a compromise, in e⁄ect concedes to the agent, giving him the freedom
to choose his preferred project. When the preferences of the two parties are rela-
tively closely aligned, the complete transfer of authority is more cost-e⁄ective for the
principal than aligning incentives via transfers and retaining authority. As the bias
increases, the transfer of authority becomes increasingly costly for the principal and
transfers start to become more cost-e⁄ective.
The same ￿gure also depicts the value derived from the optimal perfect commit-
ment contract of the previous section. As is obvious, the perfect commitment contract
dominates full delegation and the gains from the optimal contract increase as the bias
increases. Notice that full delegation already implies that the ￿rm is able to commit
not to intervene in the project choice of the agent. As the ￿gure shows, when the
principal has such commitment power, she is better advised to impose caps on the set
of feasible projects and to partially align incentives. Indeed, as the preference diver-
gence between herself and the agent grows large, the upside from a creating a more
nuanced delegation relationship (rather than the blunt instrument of full delegation)
becomes considerable.
Our results suggest that appropriate organizational design needs to account for
the degree of preference misalignment between a subunit with relevant information
and the overall objectives of the business. But if the power to perfectly commit is
available, it is never optimal to simply ￿assign authority to those who have informa-
tion.￿
256 Conclusions
We have studied optimal contracting in environments where an agent possesses infor-
mation that is important to project choice by the principal and where the objectives
of principal and agent do not coincide. The usual advice in this situation is for the
principal to delegate decision making authority to the agent while using contract
to align the agent￿ s interests. A key di¢ culty, however, is that the principal may
be unable to commit not to intervene in the project choice of the agent￿ that is,
the principal may be unable to perfectly commit to the scheme. Our main ￿ndings
concern the structure of optimal contracts when commitment is imperfect as well as
when perfect commitment is possible.
First, we show that, while it is always feasible for the principal to design a contract
aligning the agent￿ s incentives and transferring (however imperfectly) authority to
choose the project, such contracts are never optimal for the principal. The key
trade-o⁄ here is that by not incentivizing the agent to fully reveal, the principal is
able to gain a direct bene￿t by receiving more precise information from the agent
in circumstances where no payments are made as well as an indirect bene￿t￿ more
precise information from agents decreases the cost of creating incentives to fully reveal.
Indeed, in the uniform-quadratic case, full alignment contracts are always worse for
the principal than o⁄ering no contract at all.
Under imperfect commitment, the best strategy for the principal is to use com-
pensation contracts to align incentives only a fraction of the time and to pay no
compensation otherwise. When no compensation is paid, one can think of the opti-
mal arrangement as one where the principal informally solicits advice from the agent
(in the form of cheap talk) and then makes the project choice herself. Interestingly,
the proportion of the time the principal chooses to align interests is not directly pro-
portional to the bias of the agent. In the case of perfect commitment, delegation
plays a larger role, but it never pays for the principal to use contracts to fully align
incentives. Instead, the optimal contract partially aligns incentives and delegates the
authority for project choice to the agent, but with ￿caps￿on the set of projects the
agent can choose. In short, the optimal contract entails a more nuanced approach
than the simple advice of using contracts to align interests and then delegating.
Finally, we study the gains from contracting relative to the case where no contracts
are possible and relative to the case where the principal fully delegates but does
nothing to align interests. Compared to no contracting, the principal gains most
from contracting when the bias of the agent is moderate. Contracting is less valuable
when incentives are either closely aligned or far apart. Compared to full delegation,
contracting under imperfect commitment is more valuable when incentives are poorly
aligned. Compared to perfect commitment, full delegation is, of course, never optimal.
Again, the gains from contracting tend to be higher when interests are less well
aligned.
In studying optimal contracts, we have focused on the problem of information
26sharing within the ￿rm, abstracting away from the role of contracts in providing
the right incentives for information acquisition on the part of the agent. Of course,
both problems are important in organizational design. In some instances, the two
problems￿ information gathering and information acquisition￿ can be e⁄ectively de-
composed and our analysis is directly relevant. In other cases the problems cannot
be considered separately. It remains for future research to study how our conclusions
about the nature of optimal contracts change in cases where e⁄ort incentives are also
important.
7 Appendix A
This appendix contains proofs of some results pertaining to the structure of optimal
contracts under imperfect commitment in the uniform-quadratic case, speci￿cally,
Proposition 5. The following lemma is a ￿rst step.
Lemma 1 Suppose that a contract calls for revelation on [0;a] and pooling with no
payment thereafter. Such a contract is feasible if and only if the no-contract equilib-
rium that subdivides [a;1] into the maximum number of pooling intervals is played.
Proof. First, suppose that with no contracts, a size K partition of [a;1] is possible,







a ￿ 2bj (K ￿ j)
for j = 1;2;:::;K:
For a size K partition to be feasible (a1 > a) and a size K + 1 partition to be
infeasible (a1 ￿ a) together requires that:
1 ￿ a
2K (K + 1)
￿ b <
1 ￿ a
2K (K ￿ 1)
(13)
In state a, incentive compatibility implies that the agent is indi⁄erent between
the project a and the project 1
2 (a + a1),
￿b




￿ (a + b)
￿2




(1 ￿ a ￿ 2K (K ￿ 1)b)(2bK (K + 1) ￿ (1 ￿ a))
K2
The condition that t0 ￿ 0 in any feasible contract is the same as (13), the condition
that there be at most K partition elements in the interval [a;1]:
27Proof of Proposition 5. Proposition 4 implies that an optimal contract must
have separation over some interval [0;z0] (possibly degenerate) and then a number of
pooling intervals (say n￿). Suppose that the total expected transfer in this contract
is B￿: Since the contract is optimal it must also maximize the principal￿ s expected
payo⁄s among all contracts in which the expected expenditure is B￿; which one may
think of as the ￿budget￿of the principal. We will argue that every solution to a
budget constrained problem￿ and the optimal contract must be a solution to such a
problem￿ has the ￿no payment for pooling￿property.
Choose n ￿ max(n￿;N (b)) where N (b) is the maximum number of partition
elements of [0;1] with no transfers. Further, let the budget B be arbitrary. Given a
budget B, we want to construct the equilibrium maximizing the principal￿ s expected
utility among those that consist of revealing over the interval [0;z0] followed by at
most n intervals of pooling in a way that the expected transfers add up to exactly B.
Let the revealing interval be [0;z0] and let the cut points be denoted by z1;z2;:::;zn￿1
with payments ti over the interval [zi￿1;zi]. Payments for any ￿ in the revealing
interval [0;z0] are t0+2b(z0 ￿ ￿): For notational convenience, we adopt the convention
that zn = 1:






￿ (zi + b)
￿2




￿ (zi + b)
￿2
+ ti+1









2 + (1 + zn￿1)b + tn (14)
Incentive compatibility also implies that, in state z0;
￿b




￿ (z0 + b)
￿2
+ t1
and, using the solution for t1 obtained in (14) we get




2 + (1 + zn￿1)b + tn (15)
Given a budget B, the optimal contract under imperfect commitment is the solu-
tion to the following:








28subject to the constraints that (i) the total expected transfers
z0 (bz0 + t0) +
n X
i=1
ti (zi ￿ zi￿1) ￿ B
and (ii) for i = 0;1;:::;n ￿ 1;
ti ￿ 0
where ti are given by (14) and (15).
The Lagrangian associated with Problem 1 is
L = U + ￿
 
B ￿ z0 (bz0 + t0) ￿
n X
i=1






where ￿ and ￿i are multipliers. The ￿rst-order necessary conditions require that the







2 ￿ 2￿0b ￿
1
2
￿1 (z1 ￿ z0 + 2b) (16)













￿i (zi ￿ zi￿1 ￿ 2b)￿
1
2




















































Notice that the expected cost of full alignment is b: Thus, when the budget is
large enough, that is, B ￿ b; then full alignment is feasible and clearly solves the
budget constrained problem.
For any B < b; we will show that a solution to the budget constrained problem is
characterized as follows:
29First, for any point ￿ = a de￿ne K to be the integer satisfying
1 ￿ a
2K (K + 1)
￿ b <
1 ￿ a
2K (K ￿ 1)








a ￿ 2bj (K ￿ j)
for j = 0;1;2;:::;K and no transfers. Clearly since a ￿ 1; it follows immediately that
K ￿ N (b) and from Lemma 1, t0 ￿ 0..













that is, a is such that the entire budget is exhausted in getting the agent to reveal all
states ￿ 2 [0;a]:
Case 1: n = K: It is useful to begin with the case in which n = K:
The solution in this case is: for n = 0;1;2;:::;n ￿ 1;
zj = aj (20)
where a0 ￿ a: In addition,
tn = 0 (21)
We also need to specify the values for the various multipliers. These are:
￿ = ￿
4
3K2 (K2 ￿ 1)b2 + (1 ￿ a)
2
(2K (K + 1)b ￿ 1)(2K (K ￿ 1)b ￿ 1) ￿ 4a + 3a2 (22)
which is positive.







and for i = 2;:::;n ￿ 1
￿i =
(1 + 3￿)














where r1 = 1￿a
K ￿ 2b(K ￿ 1) and g (j) = r1 + 4jb + 2b:
It may be veri￿ed that the values for zi;tn together with the multipliers ￿ and ￿i
solve the necessary ￿rst-order conditions for Problem 1:
30Case 2: n > K: When n > K; a solution to the ￿rst-order conditions can be
obtained by setting z0 = z1 = ::: = zn￿K = a and for i = 1;2;:::;K, zn￿K+i = ai: The
indices of the remaining variables are also displaced by n ￿ K:
This completes the argument that the solution speci￿ed in (20) to (24) satis￿es
the necessary ￿rst-order conditions (16) to (19) associated with Problem 1. We now
show that in fact this is an optimal solution. We do this by showing that it satis￿es
both the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for an equivalent problem.
Consider the following alternative speci￿cation of the budget constrained problem
in which the choice variables are the lengths of the intervals ri = zi￿zi￿1 rather than
their end points zi:









subject to the constraints that: (i) the total expected transfers











where ti are given by (14) and (15).
Problem 2 is the same as Problem 1 except for a change of variables. Since they
share all local extrema, for every solution to the ￿rst-order conditions for Problem
1 there exists a corresponding solution to the ￿rst-order conditions for Problem 2.
But in Problem 2, the objective function is concave in the choice variables and the
constraints are all convex functions, the ￿rst-order conditions for Problem 2 are also
su¢ cient. Thus any solution to the ￿rst-order conditions for Problem 1 constitutes a
global optimum.
We have thus shown that the optimal solution to the budget constrained problem
entails that except for t0; all other ti = 0: In other words, in the optimal contract,
the principal never pays for pooling. This completes the proof of Proposition 5.
318 Appendix B
This appendix derives properties of the optimal contract under perfect commitment.




(U (y;￿) ￿ t)f (￿)d￿
subject to the law of motion
t





where y and t are the state variables and u is the control variable.
If we write the generalized Hamiltonian
L = (U (y;￿) ￿ t)f (￿) ￿ ￿1U1 (y;￿;b)u + ￿2u + ￿t
the resulting Pontryagin conditions are: there exist non-negative costate variables
















= ￿￿1U1 (y;￿;b) + ￿2 (28)
0 = ￿t (29)
and the transversality conditions are:
￿1 (1) = 0 and ￿2 (1) = 0 (30)
Lemma 2 For all ￿ 2 (0;1); y (￿) ￿ y￿ (￿;b):
Proof. Suppose that the contrary is true, that is, there exists a ￿ such that y (￿) >
y￿ (￿;b). Recall that in any optimal contract
￿￿1U1 (y;￿;b) + ￿2 = 0
and since ￿1 (￿) ￿ 0 and ￿2 (￿) ￿ 0: If ￿1 (￿) > 0, then the contradiction is immediate
since U1 (y;￿;b) < 0: Suppose that ￿1 (￿) = 0 then ￿
0
2 (￿) = ￿U1 (y;￿)f (￿) > 0 and
hence ￿2 (￿) > 0 and again there is a contradiction.
An immediate implication of the previous lemma is that the transfers are nonin-
creasing in the state.
32Lemma 3 t(￿) is nonincreasing.
Proof. The law of motion (25), is
t
0 = ￿U1 (y;￿;b)u
and from the fact that any incentive compatible y (￿) is nondecreasing, we know that
u = y0 ￿ 0: Now Lemma 2 implies that U1 (y;￿;b) ￿ 0 and so t0 ￿ 0:
Lemma 4 If t(￿) > 0, then y￿ (￿) < y (￿):
Proof. If t(￿) > 0; then from Lemma 3, for all ￿ < ￿; t(￿) > 0: This means that
￿(￿) = 0 for all ￿ 2 [0;￿]: Now (26) implies that
￿1 (￿) = F (￿) + ￿1 (0)
where F is the cumulative distribution function associated with f and from (28)
￿2 (￿) = (F (￿) + ￿1 (0))U1 (y;￿;b)
and di⁄erentiating this results in
￿
0
2 (￿) = f (￿)U1 (y;￿;b) + (F (￿) + ￿1 (0))(U11 (y;￿;b)u + U12 (y;￿;b))
Equating this with the expression in (27), we get
U1 (y;￿;b) + U1 (y;￿) = ￿
F (￿) + ￿1 (0)
f (￿)
U12 (y;￿;b) < 0
since U12 > 0: But since y ￿ y￿ (￿;b) this implies that y > y￿ (￿):
Finally, the optimal contract must involve some pooling in high states. Thus,
even though the principal has the option of full revelation, this is too expensive and
never optimal.
Lemma 5 There exists a z < 1; such that y is constant over [z;1]:
Proof. We claim that there exists a z < 1; such that t(z) = 0: If t(￿) > 0 for all
￿ 2 (0;1); then we have that for all ￿ 2 (0;1); ￿(￿) = 0: Now (26) together with
the transversality condition implies that ￿1 (￿) = F (￿)￿1; which is impossible since
￿1 (￿) ￿ 0:
33The uniform-quadratic case. In the uniform-quadratic case, the Pontryagin con-
ditions (26) to (29) are also su¢ cient since the relevant convexity conditions are sat-
is￿ed (see for instance, Seierstad and Syds￿ter, 1987). Some qualitative features of
the solution di⁄er depending on whether the bias b is less than or exceeds 1
3. These
are depicted in Figures 2 and 3, respectively.10
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